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Of Ceilings and Flaws: An Analytical Approach to the Minimum 
Performance Rule in Contract Damages 
David Pearce
*
 
Abstract - The minimum performance rule applies where the defendant who has repudiated his 
contract would have had a choice as to how to perform it. The rule requires that damages be assessed 
on the basis that the defendant would have chosen to perform in the least onerous manner. Two 
principal criticisms of the rule are made. The first is that the rule's fundamental assumption, that 
minimum performance is all the claimant is entitled to, rests on a flawed understanding of what it 
means to have a choice as to how to perform a promise. The second concerns the rule's application to 
consequential loss. Where the benefit of which the claimant has been deprived comprises 
consequential, as opposed to immediate, loss the absence of an entitlement to that benefit is not a bar 
to recovery, liability being limited by the doctrine of remoteness instead. The article then considers 
whether the rule has a continuing role in contract law. Given that those cases within its remaining area 
of application, being claims for the recovery of contractual benefits as to which the defendant made no 
promise, are not, properly considered, minimum performance cases at all, the conclusion reached is 
that the rule should be abandoned. 
Keywords: contract, damages, loss, legal theory 
1. Introduction 
Suppose a seller promises to deliver 100 tons of coal, 5% more or less at his option, 
but repudiates the contract without delivering any quantity at all. Are damages for 
non-delivery to be assessed on the basis of a notional delivery of 100 tons, 95 tons, 
105 tons or some other quantity? Given that the 'governing'1 principle of contract 
damages is that the claimant is to be placed in the same position as if the contract had 
been performed,2 it might reasonably be expected that the buyer's damages would be 
based on the quantity within the agreed range which the seller would in fact have 
chosen to deliver had he not repudiated the contract. But it is clear that the choice 
                                                        
* Centre for Business Law & Practice, School of Law, University of Leeds. E-mail: 
d.pearce@leeds.ac.uk. I am grateful for the helpful comments of the anonymous referee. Any errors 
are mine alone. 
1 Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen Kubishka Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2007] UKHL 12, 
[2007] 2 AC 353 [9] (Lord Bingham). 
2 Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850, 855 (Parke B).  
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which the seller would have made has no relevance to the assessment of damages. 
Regardless of the quantity he would actually have delivered had he performed the 
contract, the minimum performance rule dictates that damages be assessed on the 
basis of a notional delivery of 95 tons. For the rule holds that the claimant is 'only 
entitled to be compensated for the loss of those benefits which he would have been 
legally entitled to claim if his contract had been performed'.3 Had the contract 
remained in being, the buyer could not have insisted that the seller deliver any more 
than 95 tons. In this way, what constitutes the floor as regards the discharge of the 
defendant's primary obligation to perform his promise acts as the ceiling for his 
secondary obligation to pay damages for non-performance.  
The minimum performance rule has been said to make 'perfectly good sense'4 
and the great majority of writers seem happy enough with it.5 Nevertheless, the view 
put forward in this article is that the rule represents a misconceived extension of the 
orthodox principle 'that no man can be held liable in contract for failing to do what he 
is not obliged to do'.6 The rule will, in some cases at least, lead to an award of 
damages which fails to achieve that remedy's overriding purpose of placing the 
claimant in the same position as if the defendant had performed those promises which 
at the date of repudiation7 he had an outstanding primary obligation to keep.8 In the 
                                                        
3  Lavarack v Woods of Colchester Ltd [1967] 1 QB 278 (CA) 296 (Diplock LJ). For helpful 
commentaries on the operation of the rule see Adam Kramer, The Law of Contract Damages (Hart 
2014) 257-269 and  Andrew  Tettenborn  and  David  Wilby,  The  Law  of  Damages  (2nd  edn, 
Butterworths 2010) paras 19.08-19.15. 
4 Lion Nathan Ltd v C-C Bottlers Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1438 (PC) 1446 (Lord Hoffmann). But cf 
Mulvenna v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1112 [35] (Sir Anthony Evans); Horkulak 
v Cantor Fitzgerald International [2004] EWCA Civ 1287, [2004] IRLR 942 [48] (Potter LJ); Jones v 
IOS (RUK) Ltd (in liquidation) [2012] EWHC 348 (Ch) [86] (Hodge QC). 
5 A notable exception to this general acquiescence is provided by Professor Ogus who calls for the 
rule's abolition: AI Ogus, The Law of Damages (Butterworths 1973) 313-14.  
6 Beach v Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 807 (QB) 817 (Pilcher J).  
7 As matters stand, the application of the rule to cases where the parties have continued to perform the 
contract notwithstanding the defendant's breach is uncertain: compare Ferruzzi France SA v Oceania 
Maritime Inc (The Palmea) [1988] 2 LloydÕs Rep 261 (Com Ct) and Kurt A Becher GmbH & Co KG v 
Roplak Enterprises SA (The World Navigator) [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 23 (CA). 
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examination of the rule which follows, three categories of claim are identified. The 
first, and most significant, category comprises those claims where the defendant 
would have had a choice under the contract as to how to perform a promise which he 
had a primary obligation to keep. The second category comprises claims for the loss 
of an extra-contractual benefit9 which the defendant, had he performed the contract, 
might have chosen to confer on the claimant. The third category consists of claims for 
the loss of a discretionary contractual benefit 10  which the defendant, had he 
performed the contract, might have chosen to confer on the claimant.  
The article makes two principal criticisms of the rule. First, it challenges the 
validity of the rule's fundamental assumption that in claims falling within the first 
category, performance in the least onerous manner 'is all the claimant is legally 
entitled to'.11 It is shown that this assumption rests on an inadequate understanding of 
what it means for the defendant to have a choice as to how to perform his promise. 
For where a promise provides for alternative ways of performance, the promisee may 
be seen to enjoy contingent rights to each alternative, and not, as the minimum 
performance rule holds, merely a right to the least onerous alternative. Given that the 
claimant's damages should reflect 'the value of the contractual benefit to which he 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 A point recognized by Waller LJ in Mulvenna v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1112 
[19]. 
9 For present purposes, an extra-contractual benefit is one as to which the contract makes no provision 
and hence as to the conferral of which the defendant makes no promise in the contract. An example of 
a claim for an extra-contractual benefit in this context would be where the claimant alleges that, had 
the contract not been repudiated, the defendant would have chosen to enter into a follow-on contract 
with the claimant, the repudiated agreement having contained no provision for renewal.  
10 In contrast to claims under the second category, the benefit involved in a claim under the third 
category is contractual, in the sense that the contract makes provision for the benefit. But, in contrast to 
claims under the first category, the provision falls short of a promise, express or implied, by the 
defendant as to its conferral. In other words, the contract provides that the defendant has an absolute 
discretion to confer or refrain from conferring the benefit. In practice, where the benefit forms a 
substantial element of the overall consideration, the court will be reluctant to construe the discretion as 
being absolute and will look to impose certain restrictions on the defendant as to its exercise: see, eg, 
Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald International [2004] EWCA Civ 1287, [2004] IRLR 942. 
11 Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (3rd edn, OUP 2004) 151. 
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was entitled but of which he has been deprived',12 it follows that the claimant is 
entitled to compensation which reflects the value of his contingent right to the 
alternative which the defendant would have chosen. In this way damages are to be 
based on how the defendant would, and not could, have performed his promise. Nor 
is such an approach inconsistent with contractual principle. There is nothing 
inherently heterodox in the idea that the content of the secondary obligation to pay 
damages for non-performance of a promise may represent a level of performance 
greater than that which would have been sufficient to discharge the primary 
obligation to perform: what constitutes the floor as regards the primary obligation 
need not act as the ceiling for the secondary obligation. The second criticism relates 
to claims falling within the second category identified above and concerns the rule's 
failure to distinguish between the loss of contractual and extra-contractual benefits. 
The distinction is important because the loss of an extra-contractual benefit which the 
defendant might have chosen to confer on the claimant had the contract been 
performed constitutes consequential, and not immediate, loss. Where the benefit of 
which the claimant has been deprived comprises consequential loss the absence of an 
entitlement to that benefit is not a bar to recovery, liability for consequential loss 
being limited by the doctrine of remoteness instead. It follows that the minimum 
performance rule should not have any application to claims falling within either the 
first or second categories: not to the former because the claimant has a sufficient 
entitlement to the benefit of which he has been deprived; and not to the latter because 
there is no need for an entitlement to the benefit of which he has been deprived. 
On the basis that these criticisms are valid, the final substantive section of the 
article considers whether there remains a continuing, albeit much reduced, role for the 
                                                        
12 The Golden Victory (n 1) [32] (Lord Scott). 
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minimum performance rule. At first sight, the existence, identified above, of the third 
category of claim to which the rule currently applies holds out the prospect of 
continuing work for the rule to do. Yet, on closer consideration, it is clear that claims 
for the loss of a discretionary contractual benefit, that is, a benefit as to which the 
contract makes provision but as to the conferral of which the defendant has made no 
promise, are not minimum performance cases at all. For these are not cases in which 
the defendant's liability turns on the application of an irrebuttable presumption as to 
how the defendant would have chosen to perform. Where the defendant has not 
promised to confer a contractual benefit, the absence of liability in damages for the 
loss of that benefit is not dependent upon any presumption as to how the defendant 
would have chosen to act. Rather, the defendant is not liable for the simple reason 
that he did not promise to confer the benefit. The conclusion to which this reasoning 
leads is that the minimum performance rule should have no role in the law of contract 
damages. 
2. The Defendant Would Have Had a Choice as to How to Perform His Promise 
The first category, and the most common situation in which the minimum 
performance rule is applied, arises from the non-performance of a promise which 
provides on its 'face . . . for alternative methods of performance'.13 Such a promise 
                                                        
13 Abrahams v Herbert Reiach Ltd [1922] 1 KB 477 (CA) 480 (Bankes LJ). It should be noted that the 
minimum performance rule is not applicable to every situation where the defendant would have had a 
choice as to how to perform a promise. For the courts draw a sharp distinction between the situation 
where the defendant would have had a choice as to how to perform a single but broadly-defined 
obligation (a promise to do x, where the content of x is uncertain) and a choice between so-called 
alternative obligations where the contract expressly provides distinct alternatives (a promise to do x or 
y, or to do not less than x, or to do x unless y). The distinction seems to have first been made in the 
Abrahams case (ibid) where Bankes and Atkin LJJ held that the minimum performance rule had no 
application to an obligation to publish a book. Their approach was endorsed in Durham Tees Valley 
Airport Ltd v bmibaby Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 485, [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep 68 where the Court of 
Appeal unanimously held that the rule had no application to an obligation to carry on a two aircraft 
based operation at the claimant's airport. While, with respect, the distinction between single and 
alternative obligations is one without a difference, the point will not be pursued in light of the article's 
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will typically assume one of three forms.14 The first is where the defendant promises a 
minimum level of performance while enjoying the right to exceed that level: a 
promise to do not less than x. For example, a seller promises to deliver 200 tons of 
beef tallow 5% more or less at his option,15 or an employer promises to pay his 
employee an annual salary of not less than £4,000.16 When it comes to compensation 
for non-performance of the promise, the fundamental principle that 'a defendant is not 
liable in damages for not doing that which he is not bound to do'17 is said to require 
the courts to assume 'that the defendant has performed or will perform his legal 
obligations under his contract with the plaintiff and nothing more'.18 So damages for 
non-delivery of the beef tallow are assessed on the basis that the seller would have 
chosen to deliver just 190 tons and for wrongful dismissal of the employee on the 
basis that the employer would have paid an annual salary of £4,000 and not a penny 
more.  
The second variant is where the defendant's promise affords him a choice 
between different alternatives: a promise to do x or y. For example, a charterer may 
have a choice from a range of ports as to the particular port at which re-delivery of 
the vessel is to take place.19 As far as damages for non-performance are concerned, 
the assumption adopted in the case of a promise to do not less than x, that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
broader argument. It is, however, worth noting that the comments of the Court of Appeal in Durham 
Tees were limited to single obligation cases and do not affect the applicability of the minimum 
performance rule to the three variants examined in this section: see, eg, at [69] and [78] (Patten LJ) and 
[131] (Toulson LJ). Further, while Toulson LJ was clearly sceptical (see, eg, at [144]) as to the 
correctness of the approach in Paula Lee Ltd v Robert Zehil & Co Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 390 (QB) 
(where Mustill J held that the minimum performance rule applies to a single obligation which is 
subject to an implied obligation to act reasonably), Patten LJ does not appear to share those doubts. 
14 The rule is not, in principle, limited to promises made by the defendant. Because damages aim to put 
the claimant in the position in which he would have been had the contract been performed, the rule 
may be invoked where the defendant would have had the right to fix the content of the claimant's duty. 
15 Re Thornett & Fehr v Yuills Ltd [1921] 1 KB 219 (DC). 
16 Lavarack (n 3). 
17 Abrahams (n 13) 482 (Scrutton LJ). 
18 Lavarack (n 3) 294 (Diplock LJ). 
19 Santa Martha Baay Scheepvaart v Scanbulk A/S (The Rijn) [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 267 (Com Ct). 
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defendant would have performed his obligation and done nothing more, does not 
resolve the issue of how the defendant would have chosen to act. The assumption is 
accordingly modified so that it is assumed that the defendant would have chosen the 
alternative which is 'the least profitable to the plaintiff, and the least burthensome to 
the defendant'.20 So where the vessel lies outside the agreed re-delivery range when 
the charterer repudiates the charter, damages are based on a notional final voyage in 
ballast to the nearest safe port within the redelivery range.21  
The third variant is where the defendant promises to do one thing while having 
the option to substitute another: a promise to do x unless he elects to do y instead.22 
For example, a theatre company may engage a variety artiste to perform his sketch at 
the London Palladium for three weeks, while reserving the right to transfer the 
engagement to a different theatre.23  Here again the form of the assumption is 
modified. For in these cases the defendant is assumed to have exercised his right of 
substitution in the way which minimizes his liability in damages: 'if the defendant has 
under the contract an option which would reduce or extinguish the loss, it will be 
assumed that he would exercise it'.24 Whether the defendant would in fact have 
exercised the option is irrelevant: all that matters is that he could have done so. 25 
                                                        
20 Cockburn v Alexander (1848) 6 CB 791, 814; 136 ER 1459, 1470 (Maule J). This assumption has 
been formulated in different ways: see, eg, Robinson v Robinson (1851) 1 D & G 247, 258; 42 ER 547, 
551 (Lord Cranworth LC); Withers v General Theatre Corporation [1933] 2 KB 536 (CA) 551 
(Scruttton LJ); The World Navigator (n 7) 31 (Staughton LJ). In Pacific Maritime (Asia) Ltd v 
Holystone Overseas Ltd [2007] EWHC 2319 (Comm) [39] Christopher Clarke J thought that 'where 
the formulation of the assumption makes a difference, the assumption should be that [the defendant] 
would perform in the way most beneficial to itself, not that it should perform in the way least 
beneficial to the [claimant]'.  
21 The Rijn (n 19) 270.  
22 But note that the minimum performance rule does not apply to an agreed damages clause, where the 
defendant might be said to have a duty to perform the obligation unless he elects to pay the agreed 
damages instead: see, eg, Deverill v Burnell (1873) LR 8 CP 475 (CP).  
23 Withers v General Theatre Corporation [1933] 2 KB 536 (CA). 
24 Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH (The Mihalis Angelos) [1971] 1 QB 
164 (CA) 196 (Lord Denning MR).  
25 See Kurt A Becher GmbH & Co KG v Roplak Enterprises SA (The World Navigator) [1991] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 23, 33 (Staughton LJ); Automotive Latch Systems Ltd v Honeywell International Inc 
[2008] EWHC 2171 (Comm) [712] (Flaux J). To similar effect see The Golden Victory (n 1) [2005] 
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Hence damages for the artiste's wrongful dismissal are assessed on the basis that his 
engagement would have been transferred from the Palladium to a provincial theatre at 
the earliest opportunity.26  
While the way in which the assumption is expressed may vary, the fundamental 
idea in all of these cases is the same: had the defendant delivered only 190 tons, paid 
just £4,000, re-delivered the vessel at the nearest port or immediately transferred the 
artiste's engagement to a provincial theatre, such performance would not have 
amounted to a breach of contract. Nevertheless, that is not the issue. What the court 
has to establish is what the claimant was entitled to at the time the contract was 
repudiated. And to say that at that time the claimant was only entitled to performance 
in the least onerous manner demonstrates a flawed understanding of what it means to 
have a choice as to how to perform a promise. 
A. What it Means to Have a Choice 
Having a choice means having a 'bilateral'27 right: the right to do a thing and the right 
to refrain from doing that thing.28 In Hohfeldian terms, a bilateral right will be either a 
liberty-right or a power-right.29 A liberty-right is 'simply the absence of a duty not to 
                                                                                                                                                              
EWCA Civ 1190, [2006] 1 WLR 533 [6] where Lord Mance noted the arbitrator's conclusion that the 
defendant charterers were 'entitled to the benefit of a presumption that they would . . . have cancelled 
the charter'. As to the relationship between the minimum performance rule and the rule in The Golden 
Victory, see Tettenborn and Wilby (n 3) para 19.08. 
26 Withers (n 23) 551. 
27 As opposed to a 'unilateral' right: see HLA Hart, 'Bentham on Legal Rights' in AWB Simpson (ed), 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Second Series (OUP 1973) 175-76. Sumner prefers 'full' and 'half' 
respectively: see LW Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights (OUP 1989) 27. 
28 This explains why the right giving rise to a choice will be either a liberty-right or a power-right, and 
not a claim-right or an immunity-right. A buyer cannot have a claim-right that the seller deliver goods 
which correspond with their description at the same time as having a claim-right that the seller refrain 
from delivering such goods. In the same way, an employee cannot have an immunity-right that his 
employer cannot terminate his employment on less than six months' notice at the same time as having 
an immunity-right that his employer cannot refrain from terminating his employment on less than six 
months' notice. 
29 WN Hohfeld, 'Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' (1913) 23 
Yale LJ 16. Hohfeld wrote of rights, privileges, powers and immunities (ibid 30). The corresponding 
terms here are claim-rights, liberty-rights, power-rights and immunity-rights. 
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perform [an] action'.30 The defendant's liberty-right to do x signals that the defendant 
has no duty not to do x and that the claimant has no claim-right that the defendant not 
do x. In the contractual context then, a liberty-right to do x tells us that the holder may 
do x without thereby being in breach of contract. But, crucially, that is all a liberty-
right tells us.31 For liberty-rights 'do not themselves place restrictions on anyone'.32 
The defendant's liberty-right to do x of itself 'entails no obligation'33 on the claimant 
as regards x: the claimant will have no duty to co-operate in the doing of x, no duty 
not to interfere in the doing of x and no duty 'positively to see to it'34 that the 
defendant can in fact do x. It is this 'lack of guarantee'35 that distinguishes a liberty-
right from a claim-right36 and explains why liberty-rights are seen as 'very weak 
rights'.37 A power-right, by contrast, confers on the holder 'affirmative "control"' over 
some aspect of a legal relation.38  A power-right signals that the holder has the ability 
to 'expand or reduce or otherwise modify, in particular ways, his own entitlements or 
the entitlements held by [the other party]'.39 So while a liberty-right tells us what the 
holder may do, a power-right tells us what the holder can do. Thus a critical 
distinction between liberty-rights and power-rights relates to the nature of their 
respective content. Liberty-rights, like claim-rights, 'occupy the plane of primary 
                                                        
30 Nigel E Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (4th edn,  Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 300. 
31 'It is hard to overemphasize the importance and difficulty of correctly understanding what an 
Hohfeldian liberty is . . . It is easy to read more into a liberty than is there.' George W Rainbolt, The 
Concept of Rights (Springer 2006) 6. 
32 Matthew H Kramer, 'Rights Without Trimmings' in Matthew H Kramer, NE Simmonds and Hillel 
Steiner, A Debate Over Rights (OUP 2000) 11. See also Simmonds (n 30) 300; Rainbolt (n 31) 6. 
33 R M Hare, Moral Thinking (OUP 1981) 149. 
34 ibid 150. 
35 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Prentice-Hall 1973) 57 
36 'To say that a claim-right is directly correlated with a duty is simply to say that if X has a right, with 
respect to Y . . . to ϕ . . . that fact entails that Y has a duty to X not to interfere with X's ϕing.' William 
A Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights (2nd edn, CUP 2012) 73. 
37 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard UP 1990) 47. Thomson continues (ibid 52): 'it 
is not easy to imagine a background against which it can easily be understood why a man might be 
interested in getting the privilege, if he knows he is only going to get the privilege'. 
38 Hohfeld (n 29) 55. 
39 Kramer (n 32) 20.  
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rules which are concerned directly to prescribe conduct'.40 As such, they may be 
termed 'first-order' rights.41 Power-rights, like indemnity-rights, on the other hand, 
'exist on the plane of secondary rules, which are concerned not to prescribe conduct 
so much as to provide facilities for the alteration of prescriptions that obtain at the 
primary level'.42  
The distinction between liberty-rights and power-rights is thus crucial where 
the defendant has a choice as to how to perform his promise. In such cases, the right 
comprises the ability of the defendant to modify the content of his own duty.43 A 
liberty-right, as a first-order right,  will not have a duty as its content and so a liberty-
right will not enable the holder to modify the content of a duty. As a matter of 
definition, the right enjoyed by a promisor who has a choice as to how to perform his 
promise must necessarily be a bilateral power-right, and not a liberty-right. As will be 
shown immediately below, this analysis has far-reaching consequences for the 
minimum performance rule. 
(i) A promise to do x or y 
The defendant who promises to do x or y assumes a disjunctive and indeterminate 
duty.44 The choice inherent in such a promise comprises a bilateral power-right: the 
defendant enjoys the ability to fix the precise content of the duty. He can modify the 
content of the original duty, to do either x or y, into either a duty to do x or a duty to 
do y. It follows that by promising to do x or y the defendant assumes a contingent 
duty to do x and a contingent duty to do y. Depending on the choice he makes, the 
                                                        
40 NE Simmonds, 'Rights at the Cutting Edge' in Kramer, Simmonds and Steiner (n 32) 221. 
41 Sumner (n 27) 27. 
42 Simmonds (n 40) 221. As such, they may be termed 'second-order' rights: Sumner (n 27) 27.  
43 It is 'a right of election which fixes the content of his obligation': Paula Lee Ltd v Robert Zehil & Co 
Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 390 (QB) 393 (Mustill J). 
44 cf the contention in HG Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (29th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) para 21-
006 that Ôthere is no primary or basic obligationÕ but a requirement to make an election. 
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defendant will come under either a duty to do x or a duty to do y. If he chooses to do 
x, the contingent duty to do x becomes unconditional and the contingent duty to do y 
is extinguished. It further follows that until the defendant makes his choice, the 
claimant enjoys a contingent claim-right to x and a contingent claim-right to y. It is 
only when the defendant makes his choice to do, say, x that the claimant's contingent 
claim-right to x becomes unconditional and his contingent claim-right to y is 
extinguished. So until the charterer chooses the particular port at which the vessel is 
to be re-delivered, he has a contingent duty, and the owner a contingent claim-right, 
as regards each port within the range. It is not correct to say that the only duty and 
claim-right which exists is that concerning the nearest port.  
In applying the minimum performance rule to a promise to do x or y, the courts 
treat the contract as imposing a duty on the defendant to do the less onerous 
alternative, say x, and conferring on him the right to do the more onerous alternative, 
y, instead.45 It is implicit in their approach that the right to do the more onerous 
alternative, y, is a liberty-right because the claimant is said to have no right to y: '[t]he 
plaintiff cannot prove a contract for performance of the more onerous obligation'.46 
But such an analysis does not stand up to scrutiny. A liberty-right, as a first-order 
norm, cannot modify a duty. A liberty-right to do y would mean that the defendant 
had no duty not to do y so that the doing of y would not amount to a breach of 
contract. Equally, it would mean that the doing of y would not affect or extinguish the 
duty to do x. Having chosen to do y, the defendant would nevertheless remain bound 
to do x. But the right to do y must be a right to do y instead of x. By recognizing that 
                                                        
45 The effect of the minimum performance rule is thus to re-write the contract: a promise to do x or y is 
treated as if it were a promise to do x or y 'whichever is the less onerous'. But such a promise does not 
give the defendant a choice and is not the same as a promise to do x or y. 
46 Abrahams (n 13) 483 (Atkin LJ). 
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the defendant has the ability to modify the content of his duty, to substitute y for x, it 
is apparent that the defendant has a bilateral power-right, not a liberty-right.  
(ii) A promise to do x, unless the promisor elects to do y instead 
When we turn to a promise to do x unless the promisor elects to do y instead, it is 
perhaps more immediately evident that the option comprises a power-right. The 
defendant's duty to do x is contingent because by choosing to do y he can extinguish  
his obligation to do x. It follows that the claimant's claim-right to x is also contingent. 
It further follows that the defendant has a contingent duty to do y, and the claimant a 
contingent claim-right to y. But to award damages on the basis that the defendant 
would have exercised the option in the way which minimizes damages when the 
evidence indicates that he would not have exercised the option in that way will lead 
to an award of compensation which is inconsistent with the overriding purpose of 
damages because the award will not reflect the value of the contractual entitlement of 
which the claimant has been deprived.  
(iii) A promise to do not less than x 
The proper treatment of a promise to do not less than x is less clear-cut because here 
different analyses are possible. As was noted above, damages for the non-
performance of a promise to deliver 200 tons 5% more or less will be calculated on 
the basis of a hypothetical delivery of 190 tons.47 The effect of the rule is that the 
seller is treated as having no choice as to how to perform the promise. The content of 
his duty is fixed: to deliver 190 tons. This corresponds to a claim-right on the part of 
the buyer to delivery of that quantity and no other. The seller's right to deliver an 
additional quantity not exceeding 20 tons is treated as a bilateral liberty-right: the 
                                                        
47 Thornett (n 15). 
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seller may deliver, or may refrain from delivering, up to 20 tons more. Corresponding 
to the seller's liberty-right is a no-claim-right on the buyer's part. The buyer has no 
claim-right to the additional 20 tons or any part thereof, and accordingly no claim for 
the non-delivery of any part thereof. Liability attaches to the non-performance of a 
promise and the promise is to deliver 190 tons.  
While this approach is analytically sustainable, it is unlikely to reflect the 
parties' intentions.48 By treating the seller as having a duty of fixed content and a 
separate right to do more, the court deprives the seller of the very control which he 
presumably wished to retain. A duty to deliver 190 tons coupled with a liberty-right 
to deliver up to a further 20 tons means that the seller must deliver 190 tons and may 
deliver any or no part of the additional quantity without thereby being in breach of 
contract. But that is all it means. Crucially, it does not follow that there would be any 
obligation on the buyer to accept delivery of the additional quantity: a liberty-right 
does not entail any obligation of co-operation on the party against whom the liberty-
right avails. It follows that were the seller to deliver 210 tons, then applying section 
30(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979,49 there would be no duty on the buyer to accept 
any part of the delivery as the seller has only 'contracted to sell' 190 tons. It would 
also follow, on the assumption that payment would fall due on or after delivery, that 
the buyer's obligation to pay the price would not accrue. A more credible construction 
is that the parties intended that the buyer be obliged to take delivery of any quantity 
between 190 and 210 tons, the point presumably being to give the seller control over 
delivery by enabling him to insist that the claimant take delivery of any quantity 
                                                        
48 It also sits uneasily with the actual wording of the contract: why, it might be asked, if the seller's 
obligation is to deliver 190 tons, does the contract explicitly refer to 200, and not 190, tons? See 
Thornett (n 15) 220. 
49 'Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods larger than he contracted to sell, the buyer 
may accept the goods included in the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole.' 
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within that range. 50  On this construction the content of the original duty is 
indeterminate, and not fixed, with the seller having the ability, in the form of a 
power-right, to fix the content of the duty at any quantity between 190 and 210 tons. 
It would follow that the seller had a contingent duty, and the buyer, a contingent 
claim-right, in respect of any quantity within that range.  
The same argument holds with respect to the employer's promise to pay an 
annual salary of not less than £4,000. The courts treat the contract as imposing a duty 
of fixed content, to pay a salary of £4,000, and conferring the right, a bilateral liberty-
right, to pay, or refrain from paying, an additional amount. 51  But if such a 
construction is correct, it would follow that there would be no obligation on the 
employee to accept a payment which exceeds £4,000.52 Again, it seems more likely 
that the parties would intend that the employee be bound to accept a sum exceeding 
£4,000 so as to discharge the employer's salary obligation. And again, it would follow 
that the employee would have a contingent claim-right to such a sum.53 
B. Valuing Contingent Claim-Rights 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that where the defendant has a choice under the 
contract as to how to perform a promise which he has a primary obligation to keep, it 
                                                        
50 It seems that the parties to the Thornett case itself intended something different: that the seller had a 
duty to deliver 200 tons, the tolerance of 10 tons either way only excusing accidental variation. In 
other words, the seller had no choice as to the contract amount, only a margin for inadvertent error. 
The court nevertheless rejected this construction: see Thornett (n 15) 224.  
51 Lavarack (n 3). Again, a difficulty with this construction is its consistency with the actual wording 
of the contract: if the employer is promising to pay a fixed sum of £4,000 the words 'not less than' are 
otiose.   
52 Why might an employee wish to reject payment of a sum greater than that stipulated? One reason is 
that it would absolve him of the obligation to continue to make himself available for work without 
thereby being in breach of contract. Another is that acceptance of such a sum might trigger a liability 
to a third party, such as liability to tax (or, in these days of negative interest rates, liability to pay 
'interest'). 
53 A further reason to prefer the power-right construction becomes evident where the employer does 
pay more than £4,000 in salary. Generally, where an employee's salary is increased, the parties are 
assumed to have intended that the modification cannot be reversed. So, where the employer decides 
one year to pay £5,000, the employee's entitlement in the following year would be £5,000. But if the 
right to pay an additional sum is construed as a liberty-right, the salary entitlement for the following 
year would remain at £4,000. 
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will be generally be incorrect to say that the claimant is only entitled to minimum 
performance. On the contrary, the claimant is likely to have contingent claim-rights to 
each lawful alternative. How does the existence of these contingent rights affect the 
assessment of damages? The starting point is to recognize that where the defendant's 
promise, say his promise to do x or y, remains unperformed as at the date of his 
repudiation of the contract, there is substituted by implication of law for his 
outstanding primary obligation to keep the promise a secondary obligation to pay 
damages for the loss sustained by the claimant in consequence of the non-
performance of the promise.54 Such loss is generally measured by comparing the 
claimant's actual position with the position he would have been in had the promise 
been performed. Further, it is generally for the claimant to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that the loss for which he claims compensation would not have been 
suffered but for the repudiation. It follows that where the claimant can show that, had 
the contract been performed, the defendant would probably have performed the 
promise by choosing to do y, the claimant is entitled to damages for the loss of y 
notwithstanding that it would have been less onerous for the defendant to have 
chosen to do x.55 In short, what matters as far as the assessment of damages is 
concerned is how the promise would, rather than could, have been performed. While 
                                                        
54 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL) 849 (Lord Diplock). 
55 See The Palmea (n 7) 271 where Phillips J adds that where the claimant is unable to show on 
the  balance  of  probabilities which  alternative  the  defendant would  have  chosen,  the  claimant 
'must accept that the Court will proceed on the basis of the version of possible events which is 
least  favourable  to  them'  (ibid). But query whether  the same approach applies where, had  the 
contract remained alive, the choice would have fallen to be made by the defendant after the date 
on which damages are being assessed (ie the court is dealing with a hypothetical future, rather 
than  a  hypothetical  past,  event).  It  seems  that  damages  here would  be  assessed  on what may 
loosely be termed the  'loss of a chance' basis: see, eg, Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166 (HL) 
(NI) 176 (Lord Diplock): 
'in  assessing  damages  which  depend  upon  its  view  as  to  what  .  .  .  would  have 
happened in the future if something had not happened in the past, the court must 
make an estimate as to what are the chances that a particular thing will or would 
have happened and reflect those chances, whether they are more or less than even, 
in the amount of damages it awards.' 
I am grateful to the anonymous referee for raising this point. 
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minimum performance may represent a sensible default measure, the only 
irrebuttable presumption should be that the defendant would have chosen to perform 
lawfully. 
It remains to add one important rider. As a general principle, the parties to a 
contract are free to modify the secondary obligation which would otherwise arise by 
operation of law.56 Generally this is achieved by means of an express clause but there 
is no reason in principle why the limitation may not be implicit. In some cases the 
application of the minimum performance rule obscures that this is what the parties 
have in fact sought to do. An example is a notice clause in an employment contract. 
The minimum performance rule is currently routinely applied in wrongful dismissal 
claims, meaning that the court must assume Ôthat the employer would have chosen to 
have terminated the contract lawfully at the very moment that he had brought the 
contract to an end unlawfully in breach of contractÕ.57 While, it is suggested, the 
courts are right to restrict the employer's liability, the basis for the restriction has 
nothing to do with a perverse assumption that the employer did what he plainly did 
not do. Rather, liability should be limited because this is what the parties agreed. An 
action for wrongful dismissal arises where the employer, in the absence of good 
cause, fails to give proper notice of his intention to terminate the employment 
relationship.58 It follows that recoverable loss is limited to the loss of salary and other 
contractual entitlements for the proper period of notice.59 In this way, a notice clause 
may be seen to serve a dual function. It gives the employer a degree of control over 
performance of the contract, giving him the ability to bring the employment 
relationship to an end lawfully. But it also serves to limit the liability which might 
                                                        
56 See, eg, Photo Production (n 54) 849 (Lord Diplock).  
57 Jancuick v Winerite Ltd [1998] IRLR 63 (EAT) 64 (Morison P).  
58 Or fails to make the agreed payment in lieu of notice. See, eg, Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd 
(1997) 152 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC) 39 (McLachlin J). 
59 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518. 
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otherwise arise on a wrongful termination because the parties have expressly agreed 
the period for which the employer is to be liable in damages for loss of salary and 
other entitlements. So while, when assessing damages in wrongful dismissal cases, 
the courts are wrong to assume that the defendant somehow chose to terminate the 
contract lawfully, they are right to limit the claimant's damages to the extent they do, 
for the simple reason that the parties agreed that the damages should be so limited.60 
C. Discussion 
The principal refrain of those who support the application of the minimum 
performance rule to cases where the defendant would have had a choice as to how to 
perform a promise is that the rule ensures that damages accurately reflect the 
claimant's contractual entitlement: 
The rationale for giving no damages beyond the defendant's 
minimum contractual obligation is that that is all the claimant is 
legally entitled to. Had the contract been on foot, the claimant could 
not have complained if the defendant had merely performed its bare 
contractual obligation. Had it wanted a greater legal entitlement, the 
claimant could have contracted for it (presumably at an increased 
price). But it did not do so.61 
It is undoubtedly correct that the defendant who has promised to do x or y and who 
then performs the less onerous alternative, say, x, will have no liability for breach of 
contract. The claimant cannot complain that the defendant should have done y 
instead. But that misses the point. In the minimum performance cases damages are 
not being claimed because the defendant has done x. Damages are being claimed 
because the defendant has done nothing: he has failed to do x and he has failed to do 
y. Had the defendant done x, he would have no liability because he would have kept 
                                                        
60 Of course, not all contractual power-rights share this dual function. For example, in Withers (n 23) 
the power to transfer the engagement to a provincial theatre was intended to give the employer control 
as to the manner in which the contract was to be performed; likewise the cancellation clause in The 
Mihalis Angelos (n 24). In neither case was there anything to indicate that the parties also intended the 
provision to function so as to limit liability for breach. 
61 Burrows (n 11) 151. 
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his promise. But just because no liability arises where the defendant does x does not 
mean that the claimant never had any entitlement to y. Had the defendant done x, the 
claimant would have had no claim because his conditional entitlement, his contingent 
claim-right, to y would have been extinguished when the defendant chose to do x.62 
The rationale for the minimum performance rule is flawed because it treats as having 
occurred that which has not occurred.63 Equally, to say the claimant could have 
bargained for a greater entitlement also misses the point. What the claimant bargains 
for is performance: 'contracts are made to be performed'.64 Where the contract gives 
the defendant a choice as to how to perform his promise, the claimant takes the risk 
that the defendant may choose to perform in the way least beneficial to the claimant. 
But he also takes the chance that the defendant may choose an alternative of greater 
benefit to the claimant.  
Awarding damages based on the non-performance of the more onerous of two 
alternatives will not confer a windfall on the claimant where this reflects the choice 
which the defendant would probably have made. For such damages merely reflect the 
'actual consequences'65 of the defendant's repudiation and give effect to the claimant's 
claim-right by placing him in the same position as if the contract had been performed. 
There is nothing intrinsically heterodox in the principle that the content of the 
secondary obligation to compensate may reflect a level of performance greater than 
that which would have been sufficient to discharge the primary obligation to perform. 
                                                        
62 It may be that the contingent claim-right to y is only extinguished when the defendant does x, rather 
than when he chooses to do x. The parties' intentions in this regard may turn on factors such as whether 
the defendant is required to communicate his choice and the extent to, and time at, which the claimant 
may have to rely on the choice made. 
63 It is helpful to compare the position where the claimant elects not to treat the defendant's repudiation 
as bringing performance of the contract to an end but instead seeks specific enforcement of the 
defendant's outstanding promises. Were a mandatory injunction to be granted compelling performance 
of the defendant's unperformed promise to do x or y, the order would require the defendant to do x or y. 
The court would not order the defendant to do x and x alone notwithstanding that it would be less 
onerous for him to do x.  
64 The Golden Victory (n 1) [22] (Lord Bingham).   
65 Robbins v London Borough of Bexley [2013] EWCA Civ 1233 [69] Moore-Bick LJ. 
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What would constitute the floor as regards discharge of the primary obligation need 
not represent the ceiling for the secondary obligation. This is clear from examples 
both within and outwith the law of contract damages. Thus in the tort of negligence 
where the defendant is under a positive duty to act and does nothing, damages are 
based on the measures which the defendant would in fact have taken to avoid causing 
harm to the claimant notwithstanding that less onerous measures would have been 
sufficient to discharge the duty of care. 66  In contract, damages for the non-
performance of a so-called single obligation which is 'expressed in an indefinite 
way'67 will be assessed according to how the defendant would, not could, have 
performed his promise.68 Thus an employer's liability for damages for loss of a 
discretionary bonus will reflect the amount it would have paid the employee had the 
contract been performed, notwithstanding that it could have paid a lesser sum without 
being in breach of contract.69  
3. The Loss Comprises Consequential Loss  
The second category of claims identified in the Introduction provides another 
situation where the application of the minimum performance rule may lead to an 
award of compensation inconsistent with the overriding purpose of damages. For a 
further, but separate, criticism of the rule is that it fails to distinguish between claims 
for the loss of contractual and extra-contractual benefits which the defendant might 
have chosen to confer, that is between claims for immediate and consequential loss. 
An extra-contractual benefit is a benefit as to which the contract makes no provision 
and hence as to the conferral of which the defendant makes no promise, express or 
                                                        
66 ibid.  
67 Paula Lee (n 43) 394 (Mustill J).  
68 Abrahams (n 13); Durham Tees (n 13). But cf Paula Lee (n 43). 
69 See Perrins (gen ed), Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law (Div B1/1/B/(4)/(c) at 
[35]): 'the court's approach to the questions of liability and remedy are radically different'. 
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implied, in the contract. Confusion arises where it is claimed that the defendant's non-
performance has deprived the claimant of an extra-contractual benefit which the 
defendant might have chosen to confer on the claimant, most commonly through 
some post-contractual dealings between the parties. For example, the claimant may 
assert that, had the contract not been repudiated, the parties would, on its expiry, have 
entered into a follow-on contract, the repudiated contract making no provision for 
renewal. A claim for the lost benefit which the follow-on contract would have yielded 
will be barred by the minimum performance rule on the ground that the claimant had 
no entitlement to a renewal of the contract.70 But it is clear that the absence of an 
entitlement should not of itself preclude recovery here for the simple reason that the 
loss comprises consequential loss. Put another way, liability for consequential loss 
should not be subject to the minimum performance rule.71 
Identifying consequential loss in contractual claims involves asking: apart from 
not getting what he was actually promised, to what extent, if any, is the claimant 
worse off as a result of the non-performance of the defendant's promises? 
Consequential loss may comprise benefits foregone as well as positive losses and it is 
clear law that recovery of consequential loss which consists of a lost benefit is not 
                                                        
70 See, eg, Lavarack (n 3) 297 (Diplock LJ). But cf Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty 
Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 (HCA) where, in the context of a claim to recover reliance losses, a majority 
of the High Court of Australia held that damages for wrongful termination could include compensation 
for the loss of the chance of the contract being renewed had it run its course, notwithstanding that the 
defendant had had no obligation to renew. For criticism of Amann see: GH Treitel, 'Damages for 
Breach of Contract in the High Court of Australia' (1992) 108 LQR 226; Andrew Tettenborn, 'Hadley 
v Baxendale Foreseeability: a Principle Beyond its Sell-by Date?' (2007) 23 JCL 120, 136. 
71 According to Waller LJ (Mulvenna (n 8) [13]), the Withers case (n 23) shows that the minimum 
performance rule 'does apply to consequences said to flow from the breach of contract'. With respect, 
the loss in Withers is better viewed as immediate loss: it was the loss of that publicity which the 
defendants had promised to procure for the claimant. Further, while it was held in Jones v Ricoh UK 
Ltd [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch) that the minimum performance rule has no application to a claim for 
damages for breach of a negative contractual obligation, the better reason for this, it is submitted, is the 
more fundamental one that the rule has no application to consequential loss, loss caused by breach of a 
negative obligation invariably being consequential. 
  
 
21 
precluded by the absence of an entitlement to that benefit.72 Thus the claimant who 
suffers personal injury as a result of the defendant's negligence and is unable to work 
again may, in principle, recover damages for loss of future earnings up to normal 
retirement age, notwithstanding that at the time of the tort the claimant had no right to 
be employed until normal retirement age. Such loss must be recoverable irrespective 
of whether the defendant is a stranger whose negligent driving causes the injury or 
the claimant's employer and the injury occurs in the workplace due to the defendant 
employer's breach of contract. In neither case does the absence of an entitlement to 
'life-time' employment bar the recovery of damages for loss of 'life-time' earnings. In 
the same way, a claim for loss arising from the non-renewal of a contract should not 
fail simply because of the absence of a promise as to renewal. Instead, the principal 
means for limiting the defendant's liability for the loss of an extra-contractual benefit 
is provided by the doctrine of remoteness. 
In this context it is helpful to highlight the relevance of the principle that the 
defendant will not be liable where he cannot reasonably be regarded, taking account 
of the commercial background and general expectations in the particular market, as 
having assumed liability for a given kind of loss.73 A helpful example is provided by 
Mulvenna v Royal Bank of Scotland plc.74 In that case the claimant sought damages 
from his bank for loss of the profit he would have made from a loan which the bank 
would have granted him had it not, in breach of contract, failed to credit various sums 
to his account. While the Court of Appeal held that the claim was precluded by the 
                                                        
72 See, eg, Ogus (n 5) 183 citing Mitchell v Mulholland (No 2) [1972] 1 QB 65 (CA) and Tony Weir, A 
Casebook on Tort (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 646. 
73 See, eg, Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2008] UKHL 48, [2009] 1 
AC 61 [11] (Lord Hoffmann); Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd v Supershield Ltd [2010] EWCA 
Civ 7, (2010) 129 Con LR 52 [43] (Toulson LJ) and John Grimes Partnership Ltd v Gubbins [2013] 
EWCA Civ 37, (2013) 146 Con LR 26 [24] (Sir David Keene). 
74 [2003] EWCA Civ 1112. 
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minimum performance rule, 75  the alternative ground for their decision, that of 
assumption of liability, is more coherent. For while the bank might well, but for its 
alleged breach, have chosen to make a loan, having previously indicated its 
agreement in principle to do so, and while loss of profit on the claimant's part might 
have been a readily foreseeable consequence of the breach, the argument that the 
bank had never assumed responsibility for this type of loss at the time the parties 
contracted is difficult to resist.76 Thus while recoverability of an extra-contractual 
benefit which the defendant might have chosen to confer on the claimant should not 
be subject to the minimum performance rule, recovery may in practice nonetheless be 
precluded because the defendant cannot reasonably be regarded as having assumed 
liability for the loss of that benefit.77  
4. A Residual Role for the Rule? 
On the basis that the minimum performance rule should not be applied where the 
defendant would have had a choice under the contract as to how to perform a promise 
nor where the loss comprises consequential loss, does it have a continuing role in the 
law of contract damages? The prospect of such a role is, at first sight, held out by the 
third category of minimum performance case identified above: where the defendant 
might have chosen to confer a contractual benefit on the claimant, the defendant 
                                                        
75 With respect, this is hard to accept. Even on the assumption that the rule may be applied to 
consequential loss, it is clear that it does not apply where the choice comprises an external contingency 
within the defendant's control (see, eg, Bold v Brough, Nicholson and Hall [1964] 1 WLR 201 (QB)). 
It seems plain here that the choice which the bank enjoyed between making, and not making, a loan 
did not comprise a right conferred by the refinancing agreement, but comprised the right which the 
bank enjoyed regardless of its contract with the claimant.  
76 See also on this point Andrew Robertson ('The Basis of the Remoteness Rule in Contract' (2008) 28 
LS 172, 183) who noted that it might be thought 'inconsistent with commercial practice for a bank to 
accept such a risk in a transaction of this type' and The Achilleas (n 73) [20].  
77 With respect, this would seem to offer a more plausible basis for Diplock LJ's rejection of an 
employer's liability in a wrongful dismissal claim for the lost chance of renewal of the contract: see 
Lavarack (n 3) 297. 
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having no obligation to do so.78 In his dissenting judgment in Lavarack v Woods of 
Colchester Ltd Lord Denning MR held that damages were recoverable for the lost 
chance of receiving bonuses notwithstanding that Mr Lavarack 'had no legal right' to 
them.79 According to Lord Denning, Mr Lavarack's dismissal had deprived him of the 
chance of receiving future bonuses, and following Chaplin v Hicks80 and Manubens v 
Leon,81 'he is entitled to compensation for the loss of this chance'.82 But, with respect, 
neither case provides support for Lord Denning's approach. For in both Chaplin and 
Manubens the defendant had promised to give the claimant the chance of obtaining 
the benefit.83 By contrast, on Lord Denning's findings, the company in Lavarack had 
not made any promise as regards payment of a bonus. While the contract made 
provision for the benefit, it did so in terms which made clear that the claimant had no 
claim-right, contingent or otherwise, to it. A defendant will not be liable to 
compensate for the loss of a contractual benefit as to the conferral of which he made 
no promise at all. 
But it does not follow that the minimum performance rule has a distinctive role 
to play. For it is important to recognize that claims falling within this category are not 
minimum performance cases at all. The absence of liability does not turn on any 
presumption as to what the defendant would or would not have done. The claim is 
barred simply because the benefit which the claimant claims to have lost was not the 
subject of a promise which the defendant had a primary obligation to perform. In the 
same way, where the defendant promises on 1st June to paint the claimant's house for 
                                                        
78 In other words, the defendant did not have a choice as to how to perform a promise, but simply a 
bilateral liberty-right to confer or refrain from conferring the benefit. As noted above (n 10), such 
situations are likely to be relatively infrequent in practice.  
79 Lavarack (n 3) 287.  
80 [1911] 2 KB 786 (CA). 
81 [1919] 1 KB 208 (DC). 
82 Lavarack (n 3) 289. 
83 For Chaplin v Hicks see [1911] 2 KB 786 (CA) 791 (Vaughan Williams LJ) and 796 (Fletcher 
Moulton LJ and [1911-13] All ER Rep 224 (CA) 230 (Farwell LJ). For Manubens v Leon see 
Bailhache J's interruption of counsel: [1919] 1 KB 208 (DC) 210. 
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free starting on 1st August but retracts his promise on 1st July, the absence of liability 
on the defendant's part to pay damages has nothing to do with any presumption as to 
what he would or would not have done come 1st August. There is no liability to 
compensate, because there was no promise which the defendant had a primary 
obligation to perform in the first place. It follows that those cases in which the 
contractual provision for a benefit amounts only to a bilateral liberty-right on the 
defendant's part are not minimum performance cases at all. The reason why the claim 
fails is because it is a claim for the loss of a contractual benefit to which the claimant 
can assert no claim-right, contingent or otherwise.84 
5. Conclusion 
In those cases in which the defendant would have had a choice under the contract as 
to how to perform a promise which, at the time of repudiation he had an outstanding 
primary obligation to keep, the courts are wrong to treat the claimant as having no 
right to anything beyond minimum performance. While a presumption that the 
defendant would have performed the promise in the least onerous manner may 
represent a helpful and natural starting point for the assessment of damages, its 
elevation into an irrebuttable presumption operates so as to deprive the claimant of 
potentially valuable contingent claim-rights. For it is not correct as a matter of 
conceptual analysis to say that the claimant never had any greater entitlement.85 
Where the defendant repudiates the contract before choosing how to perform, the 
                                                        
84 In other words, by providing that the defendant had a liberty-right as regards the benefit, the contract 
makes clear that the defendant has no duty to confer the benefit. To award damages for the loss of the 
benefit would be inconsistent with what the parties had agreed. 
85 Where the choice comprises the right to do more of the same (ie a promise to do not less than x), it 
may be correct to construe the provision as giving the claimant no more than a right to the minimum, 
although, as noted above, this would not strictly be a case where the defendant has a choice as to how 
to perform his promise. In any event, for the reasons discussed above (see text accompanying n 48), it 
is suggested that in most cases a construction more likely to reflect the parties' intentions is that the 
claimant has contingent claim-rights to each of the possible alternatives. 
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claimant will have had, at the time of the repudiation, potentially valuable contingent 
claim-rights to each lawful alternative means of performance. The overriding 
compensatory purpose of contract damages requires the court to value those rights. 
This should be treated as a question of fact, 'a matter of evidence',86 and not a 
question of law to be determined by the application of an irrebuttable presumption. 
Damages based on how the defendant would, rather than could, have chosen to 
perform the promise neither penalize the defendant nor confer a windfall on the 
claimant. Equally the minimum performance rule should have no application to 
claims for the loss of an extra-contractual benefit which the defendant might have 
chosen to confer. While recovery for the loss of such a benefit may be precluded on 
the ground that the defendant cannot reasonably be regarded as having assumed 
liability for such a loss, the absence of any entitlement on the claimant's part to the 
benefit should not of itself be a bar. And while the courts are right to refuse claims for 
the loss of a contractual benefit as to the conferral of which the defendant made no 
promise, these cases have nothing to do with the principle of minimum performance. 
Recovery is barred simply because the defendant had no relative primary obligation: 
there is no need for any presumption as to how the defendant would have chosen to 
act.  
The conclusion to which this discussion therefore inevitably leads is that the 
minimum performance rule has no role in contract damages. It can, and should, be 
abandoned. 
                                                        
86 Giedo Van Der Garde BV v Force India Formula One Team Ltd [2010] EWHC 2373 (QB) [487] 
(Stadlen J). 
